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Abstract Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are being used
in a wide range of applications for healthcare monitoring,
like heart rate monitors and blood pressure monitors, which
can minimize the need for healthcare professionals. In med-
ical system, sensors on or in patients produce medical data
which can be easily compromised by a vast of attacks.
Although signature schemes can protect data authenticity
and data integrity, when the number of users involved in
the medical system becomes huge, the bandwidth and stor-
age cost will rise sharply so that existing signature schemes
are inapplicability for WSNs. In this paper, we propose an
efficient aggregate signature scheme for healthcare WSNs
according to an improved security model, which can com-
bine multiple signatures into a single aggregate signature.
The length of such an aggregate signature may be as long
as that of an individual one, which can greatly decrease the
bandwidth and storage cost for networks.
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Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) contain massive small,
cheap and resource-constrained sensors which can mon-
itor the physical world from remote locations [1]. Due
to these characteristics, two types of healthcare WSNs
(HWSNs), called implanted and wearable, have been paid
much attention in e-healthcare area [2–4]. In implanted
application, the user’s body is inserted by implantable med-
ical devices, such as endoscope capsule, cardiac arrhythmia
monitors, etc. In wearable application, sensors are put on
the patient’s body or at immediate proximity to patients
dressed in wearable devices for blood pressure monitor-
ing, temperature measurement, pH monitoring, respiration
monitoring, and so on. Therefore the patients are not sub-
ject to regional restrictions. In both the above applications,
patients with the wearable HWSNs can walk around freely
and get the proper medical observation. The service pro-
cess is shown in Fig. 1. The data generated by these sensors
are transmitted to the medical server, which can process
the data and provide the information to the healthcare pro-
fessionals for further analysis and appropriate actions to
patients [5, 6].
Despite such advantages in HWSNs, medical data can
be easily compromised by a vast of attacks, such as data
interception and data tampering, etc. Although signature
schemes can protect data authenticity and data integrity,
when the medical system become large scale, the existing
signature schemes are inapplicability for HWSNs. More-
over, sensors always suffer from the limited storage and
processing resources. Therefore, designing a secure and
efficient data aggregation method is very significant for
HWSNs.
The concept of general aggregate signatures was intro-
duced by Boneh et al. [7]. In a general aggregate signature
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Fig. 1 Service Process
scheme (Fig. 2), anyone can aggregate many signatures on
different messages from multiple users into a single short
one. The length of such an aggregate signature can be as
long as that of an individual one, so it can reduce the
bandwidth and storage cost for networks.
Our Contributions
In order to solve the problem of limited resources and
integrity of WSNs, an efficient aggregate signature scheme
for HWSNs is presented. The main contributions are sum-
marized as follows:
– We re-examine the security model for aggregate signa-
ture schemes defined in [7] and point out it does not
fully address the threat of coalition attacks [8, 9]. To
address this issue, we suggest to modify the security
model for aggregate signature schemes. The shining
point of our new security model is that the unique way
for generating a valid aggregate signature is to use all
valid individual signatures. So we give the adversary
the capability of launching any coalition attack. The
adversary can successfully attack the scheme only if
it outputs a valid aggregate signature using one set of
individual signatures including some invalid ones.
Fig. 2 Schematic Diagram of
the Aggregate Signature Scheme
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– We present a system model of HWSNs which contain
four components: authorized healthcare professionals,
medical server, aggregator and a large number of sen-
sors. The system model should to solve three problems
in HWSNs: network congestion, collusion attacks and
data integrity protection.
– We give a new aggregate signature scheme for HWSNs
based on the schemes [7, 10], Our scheme not only
keeps the basic signature scheme’s good feature, but
also resists coalition attacks. Furthermore, it can protect
data authenticity and integrity.
Related Work
Boneh et al. [7] presented the concept of general aggre-
gate signatures, in which anyone can combine multiple
signatures from distinct users into a short aggregate signa-
ture, so the aggregator only needs to transmit the aggre-
gate signature instead of all the single signatures. Due to
the character of compression, aggregate signature technol-
ogy is useful for lowering bandwidth and storage cost for
transmitting many message-signature pairs. Hence, design-
ing efficient and secure aggregate signature schemes has
been a significative research field since the very begin-
ning of its birth. Recently, a number of aggregate signa-
ture schemes have been presented [11–22]. Unfortunately,
most of the former schemes can not resist coalition attacks
[8, 9, 23].
Coalition attack means that some signers use a set of
individual signatures which includes at least one invalid
single signature to generate a valid aggregate signature.
This attack is not clearly addressed in the former secu-
rity models. If such an attack is successful, the resulted
aggregate signature’s validity will not guarantee the validity
of all single signatures involved in the aggregation, which
clearly breaches the aggregate signature scheme’s security
requirements. Hence, an appropriate security model for the
aggregate signature scheme should take coalition attacks
into consideration. Thus, for the construction of an aggre-
gate signature scheme, besides the secure basic signature
scheme, a secure aggregate algorithm resistant to coalition
attacks is an imperative problem to be solved.
Organization
In the following section, we give the preliminaries
demanded in this paper. “Security Model and System
Model” presents our improved security model of the aggre-
gate signature scheme and the system model of HWSNs.
In “A New Aggregate Signature Scheme”, we give our
aggregate signature scheme with a designated verifier for
HWSNs, then provide the security analysis, performance
analysis and the typical applications. Finally, “Conclusion”
is the conclusion.
Preliminaries
This section revisits the basic concepts which are prereq-
uisite in this paper. We use some notations [10] in the
following paper. Let G1 and G2 denote two multiplica-
tive cyclic groups with the same prime order p; let g1
be a generator in G1 and g2 be a generator in G2. GT
is an additional group such that |G1| = |G2| = |GT |.
Finally, let a computable isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1
with ψ(g2) = g1.
Bilinear Pairing
Let G1,G2,GT , p, g1, g2 be the same as mentioned above.
Let eˆ : G1 × G2 → GT be a bilinear pairing with the
following properties:
– Bilinear: for all h ∈ G1, k ∈ G2, μ, ν ∈ Z∗p,
eˆ(hμ, kν) = eˆ(h, k)μν .
– Non-degenerate: eˆ(g1, g2) = 1T , where 1T is the
identity element of GT .
– Computable: for all h ∈ G1, k ∈ G2, eˆ(h, k) is
efficiently computable.
Complexity Assumptions
In this section, we give some complexity assumptions [7, 10]
needed in the following paper.
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem Given
the elements g, gμ, gν ∈ G, to compute gμν ∈ G. The CDH
assumption states that the CDH problem is hard. Let A be a
CDH problem solver, and let AdvCDHA be the advantage of
A in solving the CDH problem, then
AdvCDHA = Pr[A(g, gμ, gν) = gμν : μ, ν ∈ Z∗p]. (1)
Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem Given the ele-
ments g, gμ, gνgκ ∈ G, output Y if κ = μν, output N
otherwise.
Computational Co-Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH) Problem
Given the elements h ∈ G1 and g2, gμ2 ∈ G2, compute
hμ ∈ G1.
Decision Co-Diffie-Hellman (co-DDH) Problem Given
the elements h, hν ∈ G1 and g2, gμ2 ∈ G2, output Y if
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μ = ν, output N else. We say that the tuple (g2, gμ2 , h, hμ)
is a co-Diffie-Hellman tuple if the answer is Y .
Note that when G1 = G2 and g1 = g2, the co-CDH
problem reduces to CDH problem, and co-DDH problem
reduces to DDH problems.
Co-Gap Diffie-Hellman (co-GDH) Group Pair If co-
DDH is easy but co-CDH is hard in (G1,G2), then we
define the pair of groups (G1,G2) be a Co-GDH group pair.
Please refer to [7, 10] for the detailed definition.
Outline of Aggregate Signature Schemes
Definition of Aggregate Signature Schemes
Figure 2 is the schematic diagram of an aggregate signature
scheme. A general aggregate signature scheme comprises
of a basic signature scheme, an aggregate algorithm and
an aggregate verify algorithm. More specifically, a gen-
eral aggregate signature scheme comprises six algorithms:
Setup, Key Extract, Sign, Verify, Aggregate and Aggregate
Verify. Please refer to [7] for more detailed description.
Revisiting The Security Model in [7]
As presented in [7], the motivation of aggregate signa-
tures is to create one aggregate signature from many single
signatures which are generated by individual users. This
aggregate signature has the property that it can convince the
verifier that each user actually signed its message, respec-
tively. This indicates that inputting all the valid individual
signatures into the aggregate algorithm is the only way to
generate a valid aggregate signature.
The adversary A is only dispensed a single public key
in the security model [7], its target is to existentially forge
an aggregate signature. A’s power is that A can choose
all public keys except the challenge one, can access to a
sign oracle on the challenge key. Then, the advantage of A,
AdvAggSigA , is defined to be the success probability in the
following game.
Setup The aggregate forger A is given a public key PK1,
which is randomly generated.
Queries Proceeding adaptively, A requests signatures with
PK1 on messages of his choice.
Response Lastly, A outputs r − 1 added public keys
PK2, . . . , PKr . Here r ≤ N , N is the game parameter.
A also outputs distinct messages {M1, . . . ,Mr}. Then in
the end, A outputs an aggregate signature σ of the r users
under the public keys {PK1, . . . , PKr} on corresponding
messages {M1, . . . ,Mr}.
The forger A wins the game if the following conditions
are satisfied:
– σ is a valid aggregate under public keys
{PK1, . . . , PKr} on messages {M1, . . . ,Mr};
– Signature on (M1, PK1) has been not queried by A.
Obviously, in the above security model, the adversary A
can successfully forge a valid aggregate signature if A can
forge the single signature, that is to say, A just needs to
attack the security of the basic signature scheme involved.
So, it is easy to suffer from coalition attacks. If someone
can successfully implement such attacks, that is to say, an
aggregate signature is not able to convince the verifier that
each signer really signed the initial message.
Security Model and System Model
Improved Security Model of the Aggregate Signature
Scheme
Clearly, a existentially unforgeable aggregate signature
scheme requires both the involved basic signature scheme
and the aggregate algorithm should be existentially unforge-
able. However, the adversary merely forge the single sig-
nature in most of the former security model, i.e. they only
attack the security of the involved basic signature scheme.
Therefore, we mainly consider the aggregate algorithm’s
security in the following improved security model.
The capacity of an adversary in the former security model
for aggregate signature is limited, because the adversary can
not access all the secret signing keys. We make some modi-
fication to the security model defined in [7]. In our improved
security model, we permit the adversary to get all signers’
secret signing keys by accessing the relevant oracles. The
adversary’s purpose is to forge a valid aggregate signature
using a set of individual signatures which contains at least
one invalid individual signature. Now we give our improved
security model of the aggregate signature scheme through
the coming game between an adversary A and a challenger
C. The game is shown in Fig. 3.
Awins the game if the following conditions are satisfied:
– σ ∗ is a valid aggregate signature under public keys
PKui and messages mi , i = 1, . . . , n.
– At least one single signature used to generate σ ∗ is
invalid.
We denote AdvAggSigA be the adversary’s advantage
in attacking an aggregate signature scheme as its success
probability in winning the above game.
Definition We say an aggregate signature scheme is (t, n)-
secure against an adversaryA, ifA runs in polynomial time
J Med Syst (2016) 40: 244 Page 5 of 10 244
Fig. 3 Game
t , the forged aggregate signature is by at most n users, and
AdvAggSigA is negligible.
System Model
In HWSNs, integrity, authenticity, confidentiality are con-
sidered as three significant aspects [2, 24]. It is crucial that
no data falsify during transmissions. The main consider-
ation of our system model is to protect data authenticity
and integrity while reducing bandwidth and storage cost for
HWSNs. Our system model for HWSNs consists of four
parts as shown in Fig.4: authorized healthcare professionals,
medical server, aggregator and a large number of sensors.
– Authorized healthcare professionals have a certain
ability to calculation and communication, can ana-
lyze the data generated by the sensors, and can make
appropriate actions for patients.
– Medical server has a strong computing power and
storage space, can process all original big data col-
lected by sensors, can provide the patients’ data infor-
mation to healthcare professionals. At the beginning,
every medical server, will receive its public-secret key
pair (PKserver , SKserver ), and publish the public key
PKserver . In our system, medical server also works as
the designated verifier who can verify the aggregate
signatures using its secret key SKserver .
– Aggregator has a certain ability to calculation and com-
munication, can get the medical server’s public key
PKserver , can produce the aggregate signature and send
it to the medical server. Every care district consists of
one aggregator and many sensors.
– Sensors are resource-limited devices, each sensor
belongs to one care district. We assume that when sen-
sor i is deployed, it is embedded with its public-secret
key pair (PKi, SKi) = (Xi, xi). Each sensor i is able
to sign messages generated from the physical world
using its private key xi , and send messages and its
signatures to their aggregator.
For health monitoring in the system model, sensors are
placed on or in a patient’s body. These sensors can sense
the patient’s blood pressure, pH-value and heart rate, and
can transmit these information to medical server via the
aggregator. However, data can be easily compromised by
various attacks during the transmission and aggregation,
such as data tampering, coalition attacks. Thus, three critical
problems should be considered in our system:
Fig. 4 HWSNs System Model
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– How can medical data integrity in HWSNs be pro-
tected?
– How can storage cost and bandwidth be reduced?
– How can coalition attacks in HWSNs be resisted?
In order to guarantee authenticity and integrity of med-
ical data, each sensor creates signatures using its private
key for the information generated by itself. Then the sen-
sors in the same care district send the signatures to their
aggregator. For example, in Fig. 4, in Care District 1, every
sensor i generates message mi and the corresponding sig-
natures σ1i , sends them to the aggregator (i = 1, 2, . . . , n).
Then the aggregator will send these information to the
medical server. In order to avoid network congestion, the
aggregator should adopt data aggregation methods. In our
system, the aggregator generates an aggregate signature
σ1 = Agg(σ11, σ12, · · · , σ1n) using the aggregate signa-
ture technique, and sends σ1 to the medical server, then the
medical server verifies σ1. If σ1 is valid, the medical server
provides the patients’ data information to healthcare profes-
sionals, which make suitable actions to patients. Else if σ1
is invalid, the medical server rejects it. Figure 5 illustrates
the scheme flow of HWSNs.
The aggregate signature technique can compress signa-
tures, instead of transmitting many message-signature pairs.
In the following section, we give an efficient aggregate sig-
nature scheme for HWSNs. To overcome coalition attacks,
each aggregator adopts the designated verifier’s public key
PKserver and a collision resistent hash function H to gen-
erate the aggregate signature. In our system, the designated
verifier is just the medical server.
A New Aggregate Signature Scheme
Construction
In this section, we provide a secure aggregate signature
scheme. We adopt the famous BLS short signature scheme
in [10] as the basis to construct our scheme. Our scheme
can guarantee that if the involved basic signature scheme
is existentially unforgeable, then all signers involved in the
aggregate algorithm really signed the corresponding mes-
sage once the aggregate signature is valid. The new scheme
consists of six algorithms: Setup, Key Extract, Sign, Verify,
Aggregate and Aggregate Verify.
Setup Let G1,G2,GT , p, eˆ, g1, g2 and ψ be the same as
ones defined in “Preliminaries”. H,H1 are full-domain col-
lision resistant hash functions. H : {0, 1}∗ → G1, H1 :
{0, 1}∗ → Z∗p. Let (PKserver , SKserver ) be a random
public-secret verification key pair of the medical server,
where SKserver = s ∈R Z∗p, PKserver = gs2.
Key Extract For a specific sensor, pick x ∈ Z∗p randomly,
then compute X = gx2 ∈ G2. The sensor’s public-secret key
pair is (PK, SK) = (X, x).
Sign For a specific sensor, given a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗
and secret key x, compute the signature σs as the following:
h = H(m), σs = hx.
Verify Given a signature σs , a message m and a specific
sensor’s public key X, compute h = H(m), and then check
if the equation
eˆ(σs, g2) = eˆ(h,X) (2)
Fig. 5 HWSNs Flowchart
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Table 1 Definition of
notations Notation Definition
aggregate aggregate scheme
un-aggregate un-aggregate scheme
|m| the overall length of {m1,m2, . . . , mn}
M the computation cost of a scalar multiplication calculation in G1 or G2
MGT the computation cost of a multiplication calculation in GT
E the computation cost of an exponentiation operation in G1 or G2
EGT the computation cost of an exponentiation operation in GT
P the computation cost of a pairing operation in GT
holds or not. If it holds, then accept; otherwise, do not
accept.
Aggregate Define U ∈ U as the aggregating subset of
sensors, and define n = |U |. Each sensor ui ∈ U with
public key Xi generates a signature σi on a message mi ∈
{0, 1}∗ which sensed by itself (i = 1, . . . , n). Moreover,
denote PKserver as the public key of the medical server
(s is the corresponding secret key, i.e. PKserver = gs2 ).
Compute
τ = H1(eˆ(σ1, PKserver ), . . . , eˆ(σn, PKserver )), (3)
σ ′ = ni=1σi, (4)
σ = σ ′τ . (5)
The aggregate signature is σ .
Aggregate Verify Given an aggregating signers subset U
of n sensors {u1, . . . , un}, and the public key Xi ∈ G2
for every sensor ui (i = 1, . . . , n), an aggregate signature
σ ∈ G1 on the initial messages {mi, . . . , mn}. To verify the
aggregate signature σ , for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n = |U |, the
medical server computes hi = H(mi), and accepts if the
following equation holds:
eˆ(σ, g2) = ni=1eˆ(hτ
′
i , Xi), (6)
where
τ ′ = H1(eˆ(hs1, X1), . . . , eˆ(hsn,Xn)). (7)
Security Analysis
The security proof of existential unforgery on the basic sig-
nature scheme involved has been given carefully in Theorem
1 of [10], which assumes (G1,G2) is a co-GDH group pair,
and proves the EUF-CMA (existentially unforgeable against
adaptive chosen message attacks) secure [25, 26] in the ran-
dom oracle model. So we only prove the security of the
above aggregate algorithm.
Theorem 1 Suppose the hash function H1 is collision
resistent. Then the aggregate signature in the above aggre-
gate signature scheme is valid, if and only if each individual
signature used in the aggregation is valid.
Proof If each individual signature involved in the aggrega-
tion is valid, then
eˆ(σi, g2) = eˆ(hi, Xi), eˆ(σi, PKserver )
= eˆ(σi, gs2)
= eˆ(hsi , Xi), i = 1, . . . , n.
So we have
τ = H1(eˆ(σ1, PKserver ), . . . , eˆ(σn, PKserver ))
= H1(eˆ(hs1, X1), . . . , eˆ(hsn,Xn))
= τ ′
and
eˆ(σ, g2) = eˆ((ni=1σi)τ
′
, g2)
= ni=1eˆ(σ τ
′
i , g2)
= ni=1eˆ(hτ
′
i , Xi).
That is to say, the resulting aggregate signature σ is valid.
In addition, if the aggregate signature σ is valid, then we
have
eˆ(σ, g2) = ni=1eˆ(hτ
′
i , Xi)
and
τ ′ = H1(eˆ(hs1, X1), . . . , eˆ(hsn,Xn))
= H1(eˆ(σ1, PKserver ), . . . , eˆ(σn, PKserver ))
= τ.
Table 2 Performance comparison of communication cost
Un− aggregate Aggregate
Sensors→Aggregator n|G1| + |m| n|G1| + |m|
Aggregator → Medical Server n|G1| + |m| |G1| + |m|
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As H1 is collision resistant, we have eˆ(σi, PKserver ) =
eˆ(hsi , Xi), and hence eˆ(σi, g2) = eˆ(hi, Xi), for each
i = 1, . . . , n. This indicates each individual signature
involved in the aggregation is valid. Equations (3, 4 and 5)
ensure that the medical server can not forge the aggregate
signature.
Therefore, with the security proof of schemes in [7, 10],
we can get the conclusion that our aggregate signature
scheme is existentially unforgeable.
Observation By now, most the known aggregate signa-
ture schemes are insecure against coalition attacks. Some
of them can be modified to secure ones by using a
collision resistant hash function and the verifier’s pub-
lic key in the aggregating process, which can ensure that
an aggregate signature’s validity implies each individ-
ual signature’s validity involved in the aggregation. And
from the above analysis, we are able to find that the
coalition attacks are directed at the aggregate algorithm,
so such attacks are appropriate not only to public key
infrastructures but also to certificateless and identity-based
surroundings.
Performance Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our scheme.
We firstly retrospect each component’s function in our
scheme. Authorized healthcare professionals can analyze
the data generated by the sensors and make appropriate
actions for patients. Medical server has a strong computing
power and storage space, can process all original big data
collected by sensors. Aggregator can produce the aggre-
gate signature and send it to the medical server. Sensors
have limited resources, can collect the health information of
patients and send the information to their aggregator. The
description of some notations to be used in this section is
given in Table 1.
Communication Cost
Table 2 gives the communication cost comparison of
two versions: un-aggregate scheme and aggregate scheme.
The comparison indicates that the aggregate scheme can
reduce (n − 1)|G1| transmission cost in one process of data
aggregation, concurrently, can reduce (n − 1)|G1| storage
cost. Therefore, our scheme is efficient in data aggregation
method for HWSNs.
Efficiency Comparison
Table 3 gives the efficiency comparison of our aggregate
scheme with some existing pairing based schemes. Our
scheme can resist coalition attacks while more pairing oper-
ations are needed during the process of aggregate verify
(recall that the medical server has a strong computing power
to verify the aggregate signature).
Application
WSNs have been widely applied in many areas, such
as biomedical health monitoring and target tracking. Our
aggregate signature scheme for HWSNs not only can guar-
antee authenticity and integrity of medical data, but also can
avoid network congestion. So it has practical applications
in healthcare medical system, such as medical monitoring
system and home monitoring network system, etc. The fol-
lowing is the typical applications and Fig. 6 illustrates the
general process.
– HWSNs in hospitals make the healthcare profession-
als gain more accurate physiological parameters, then
improve the life quality of patients, especially for age-
related chronic disease. Sensors can continuously gen-
erate huge data on patient physiological signals, which
will be beneficial to patient healthcare and for further
research.
– In-home healthcare of elderly becomes an urgent social
problem, the traditional healthcare system cannot sat-
isfy the present developmental needs. Furthermore,
some patients can be recovering at home (even in
the office), and they also need the in-home health-
care. HWSNs can fix this, it can minimize the need
for healthcare professionals. The elderly and patients
with the wearable HWSNs can move freely at home.
Sensors generate the real-time data and transmit these
information to the medical server. Finally, healthcare
Table 3 Efficiency
comparison of some pairing
based aggregate schemes
Scheme Sign Aggregate verify Coalition attacks resistance
[7] E (n + 1)P + (n − 1)MGT No
[11] M (n + 2)P + nMGT No
[13] E (n + 1)P + (n − 1)MGT No
[17] M (n + 1)P + (n − 1)MGT + nM No
Ours E (2n + 1)P + 2nEGT + (n − 1)MGT Yes
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Fig. 6 Typical Applications
professionals will get these data for further analysis
and make appropriate actions to those who need further
treatments.
Conclusion
In this paper, we modified the aggregate signature’s security
model defined in [7] combining with the coalition attacks
[8, 9]. Then for healthcareWSNs, we proposed an aggregate
signature scheme, which achieves not only data authenticity
and integrity, but also the lower cost of storage and commu-
nication. Furthermore, our scheme not only keeps the Boneh
et al. scheme’s good feature about a short signature, but
also resists coalition attacks of aggregate signature schemes.
Next, we will focus on designing secure aggregate signature
schemes without using the medical server’s public key for
HWSNs.
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